Henry Boyo
This column has consistently maintained
that the root cause of our economic paradox of increasing income, with
unbridled unemployment rate, and deepening poverty will be found in the
conscious but incorrect adoption of a faulty and distortional process
for the infusion of our crude export dollar revenue.
Hereafter, we will discuss the related
adverse consequences of the Current Payments Model against the positive
attributes of the Advocated Payments Model for the allocation, for
example, of $1bn export revenue in the following explanatory steps.
Thus, in the CPM: -1 The Central Bank of
Nigeria unilaterally determines the naira exchange rate and thereafter
unconstitutionally captures the distributable $1bn revenue and
prints/creates in replacement (read as monetises) N200bn as statutory
allocations, which are then domiciled in the bank accounts of
beneficiaries.
CPM:-2 If, however, the CBN’s mandatory
cash reserve ratio for banks is, for example, 10 per cent, the N200bn
inflow can be leveraged 10-fold, to create additional credit and expand
consumer spending power which will invariably fuel inflation. The recent
establishment of the Treasury Single Account will, regrettably, only
temporarily absorb such cash injections, as the N200bn allocation, for
example, will ultimately migrate, when spent, into private sector bank
accounts and invariably expand naira liquidity, consumer demand and the
banks’ credit capacity.
CPM:-3 In response to the resultant
inflationary threats, the same CBN, ironically, “altruistically” sells
treasury bills and borrows money it does not need
, often, at over 10 per
cent, just to combat the challenges of systemic excess naira and
excessive consumer demand! Inexplicably, however, despite the crying
need of the real sector for cheap funds, these CBN borrowings are simply
kept sterile, while fresh cash interventions are created to stimulate
sectors of the economy, despite the subsisting systemic liquidity
challenge.
CPM:-4 Since unrestrained access to
excess cheap funds fuels inflation with adverse economic and social
consequences, the CBN responds by raising its Monetary Policy (Control)
Rate to force banks to also significantly increase their own lending
rates, so that higher cost of funds would ultimately discourage
borrowing, and sadly, inadvertently also reduce any prospect of
industrial growth and job creation. Thus, the CBN unexpectedly becomes
vicariously liable for the very high cost of funds that cripple the real
sector.
CPM:-5 Meanwhile, the ministries and
state governments that require imports to enhance social infrastructure,
become constrained to buy back their earlier captured dollars at a
higher regulated rate from commercial banks, that strangely become the
prime beneficiaries of the CBN’s dollar auctions. Ultimately, naira
exchange rate comes under threat as increasingly surplus naira is
unleashed by the CBN to chase the dollar rations it regularly auctions.
Consequently, the market dynamics of demand and supply become
unfavourably skewed against the naira, ironically, despite the CBN’s
custody of relatively impressive “reserves”.
CPM:-6 The less dollars sold, the larger
would be the CBN’s purported reserves, but the weaker ironically also
will be the naira rate, as less and less dollars compete against the
flood of excess naira that the apex bank earlier instigated. Ultimately,
the gap between official and black market naira rates will invariably,
widen, to provide irresistible opportunities for speculation, hoarding
and currency round tripping.
CPM:-7 In order to reduce the gap
between parallel market and official exchange rates, the CBN commits the
unforced error of allocating dollars to the Bureau de Change operators,
who in turn funded the requirements of treasury looters and smugglers
of contrabands, not minding the adverse economic impact of such
misguided dollar allocations. (Thankfully, after seven long years of our
advocacy of this recklessness, the CBN terminated this clearly
obnoxious strategy of official dollar sales to the BDCs in January
2016).
Conversely the Advocated Payments Model will turn around the existing counterproductive process and operate as follows.
APM:-1 The same $1bn distributable
revenue is not immediately substituted with N200bn allocation; instead,
constitutional beneficiaries receive dollar certificates equal to their
respective allocations, while the actual $1bn remains domiciled in the
CBN, so that the naira exchange rate is conversely determined by,
competitive market forces of demand and supply between banks and holders
of dollar certificates.
APM:-2 With strictly dollar allocations,
the $1bn income does not translate to additional FRESH naira injection;
consequently, naira supply remains the same, and cannot therefore
further instigate the usual disenabling spectre of systemic surplus cash
which usualy fuel inflationary consequences.
APM:-3 In the absence of the usual naira
surplus, the CBN does not have to mop up excess naira liquidity by
borrowing money it does not need, often with interest rates above 10 per
cent. Consequently, the present N12tn ($60bn) oppressive debt and
related service charges will become restrained. Additionally, reduced
government borrowing will also naturally force commercial banks to chase
the real sector for business and promote economic growth.
APM:-4 Furthermore, with optimal naira
liquidity, the CBN can gradually align its Monetary Policy (Control)
Rate to international best practice below three per cent; commercial
banks will also, without persuasion, correspondingly drop lending rates
across board to single digit, and chase real sector borrowers.
APM:-5 The MDAs and state governments
can directly exchange for naira, all or portions of their dollar
allocations from time to time, through commercial banks. Thus, in the
absence of the usual naira surge when the CBN substitutes fresh naira
creations for dollar revenue, the market dynamics will inevitably change
to favour the naira, with relatively more dollar supply chasing the
already existing naira balances. A stronger naira rate will expectedly
reduce production cost and also lower fuel prices to make subsidy
totally unnecessary. Furthermore, a 10 per cent sales tax on cheaper
petrol and kerosene would favourably consolidate over N1000bn annually
into the treasury.
APM:-6 The CBN’s usual monopolistic
dollar auctions will cease, as the constitutional beneficiaries directly
trade their dollar certificates for existing naira balances with banks
before spending, (as the dollar is not legal tender in Nigeria).
Nonetheless, the dollars will remain domiciled with the CBN,
irrespective of the ultimate buyer, until the apex bank receives
appropriate instruction from respective banks to directly pay overseas
suppliers of “authorised” goods/services, from the dollar balances in
the dormicilary accounts the banks maintain with the CBN. This payment
process certainly provides a more transparent usage of funds than
presently. It is understandable that banks and other rent seekers would
reject this reform.
APM:-7 With optimal naira liquidity and
relative dollar surplus, the naira rate will gradually improve, and
stabilise; this will promote the perception of naira as a safe store of
value over time. Furthermore, with reduced opportunities for round
tripping, capital flight and speculative dollar purchases, the black
market for the dollar will rapidly contract.
Sadly, the patriotic and rational
fervour evident in President Muhammadu Buhari’s recent affirmation, at a
meeting with the Nigerian community in Kenya, that he did not see any
valid reason to further devalue the naira, may ultimately come to
nothing if the increasing pressure from local and international experts
and powerful interest groups persists and the gap between official and
parallel exchange rates further widen beyond N100/dollar.
In conclusion, therefore, the present
payment system will shunt us back to the fourth world, while the
advocated model will propel us amongst the top world economies within a
decade. Clearly, our fate as a nation is not in our stars, but obviously
in the choices we make!
This article is reproduced in response
to several inquiries to explain the thrust of the solution regularly
proposed in this column for a stronger naira.
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